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Erdoğan was the Gezi Park Resistance Movement4, 
where the government’s methods of repression and 
police brutality made the movement famous world-
wide. I will conclude the paper with the final analy-
sis and suggestions for further research for readers 
who are interested in the subject.
ORGANIC INTELLECTUALS AND HISTORICAL BLOC
Antonio Gramsci is widely recognized as one of the 
most important Marxist theorists of the twentieth 
century. His most important contribution to Marx-
ist political theory has been the introduction of the 
concept of hegemony. In this context, Gramsci ar-
gues that the bourgeoisie does not merely use bru-
tal force during its everlasting quest to subordinate 
the proletariat. To achieve that, “the dominant class 
must establish its own moral, political and cultural 
values as conventional norms of political behaviour. 
This is the essential idea embodied in ‘hegemony’ 
[…]” (Femia 3). According to Gramsci, organic in-
tellectuals play an instrumental part in the estab-
lishment and continuity of cultural hegemony. The 
term organic intellectual appears in Gramsci’s most 
internationally acclaimed work, Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks, with the aim of differentiating the 
new intellectuals of the capitalist system from the 
intelligentsia as we know it. The familiar intelligen-
tsia corresponds to the traditional intellectuals that 
considered themselves to be a separate social enti-
4 The Gezi Park Resistance Movement was a protest movement 
that occurred during the summer of 2013. Originally begin-
ning as a sit-in against the destruction of a park in central Is-
tanbul, the protests spread throughout the country, generally 
as a result of police brutality. For more information, see. The 
Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey: #occupygezi, edited 
by Umut Özkırımlı, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I will try to underline the role of intellectuals in Turkey during President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s first five years as Prime Minister1 
in establishing his hegemony. The analysis will be 
conducted using a Gramscian approach. I will begin 
the paper by presenting the framework. I will give 
a brief definition of the concepts called organic in-
tellectuals and historical bloc, coined by the Italian 
Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci. Following the 
theoretical introduction, I will give empirical evi-
dence, using excerpts from articles and interviews 
of three prominent intellectuals2 who are known as 
the Birikim troika3 in the Turkish academic and jour-
nalistic sphere. It is worth noting that two out of the 
three writers included in the paper were well-known 
full professors of economics and comparative liter-
ature in Galatasaray University and Istanbul Bilgi 
University, respectively. These authors, while claim-
ing to be socialists and Marxists, gave Erdoğan and 
his openly conservative and right-wing party, AKP 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Develop-
ment Party), full support until 2013. The breaking 
point in the relationship between the writers and 
1 This timeframe corresponds to the entirety of his first term, 
and the beginning of his second term in power.
2 Some of these articles and interviews are only in Turkish. 
The English translations have been done by me. Naturally, 
all responsibility concerning any confusion or faults in 
translation is entirely mine.
3 Birikim, meaning accumulation or accumulated knowledge, is 
a Turkish journal which had been focusing on Marxist thought 
between 1974 and 1980, until it was shut down by the military 
junta. After it started being published again in 1989, the jour-
nal accommodated authors from other intellectual circles as 
well. The journal’s tagline is Monthly Journal of Socialist Cul-
ture. The term Birikim troika was coined by the Turkish polit-
ical scientist Ümit Cizre in her edited volume, The Turkish AK 
Party and its Leader: Criticism, Opposition and Dissent, edited 
by Ümit Cizre, Routledge, 2016.
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scian scholars, Stephen Gill, defines the historical 
bloc as such:
It refers to an historical congruence be-
tween material forces, institutions and ide-
ologies, or broadly, an alliance of different 
class forces politically organized around a 
set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic 
direction and coherence to its constituent 
elements. […] For a new historical bloc to 
emerge, its leaders must engage in ‘con-
scious planned struggle’ in both political 
and civil society. Any new historical bloc 
must have not only power within the civil 
society and economy but it also needs per-
suasive ideas, arguments and initiatives 
that build on, catalyze and develop its polit-
ical networks and organization. (60-61)
In the upcoming part, I will demonstrate with 
examples as to how those “persuasive ideas, 
arguments and initiatives” were propagated by the 
organic intellectuals of Turkey.
AKP AND THE ORGANIC INTELLECTUALS OF TURKEY
Before demonstrating the role of the organic intellec-
tuals in Turkey, it would be important to give a brief 
presentation of the context in which examples from 
their works will be examined. The social force which 
employed them, AKP, first came to power following 
the elections in November 20027, right after Turkey 
experienced the most destructive economic crisis of 
its history in February 2001. The founding members 
of the party had split from the Islamist party tradi-
tion in Turkey, announcing that they would be more 
reformists, and would align themselves more with 
the centre-right conservative democratic position, 
essentially pledging allegiance to the project of in-
7 Erdoğan, who is the founding leader of the party, was not al-
lowed to run in the elections, since he was banned from active 
politics on 1998 for a period of five years. After the parliament 
voted to remove his political ban, he got elected in a by-elec-
tion on 2003 and took office as Prime Minister, a post he held 
until his election to Presidency in 2014.
ty, not linked to the dominant class. Gramsci states 
that: 
The intellectuals are the dominant group’s5 
‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions 
of social hegemony and political govern-
ment. These comprise: 1. The ‘spontaneous’ 
consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed 
on social life by the dominant fundamental 
group; this consent is “historically” caused 
by the prestige (and consequent confidence) 
which the dominant group enjoys because 
of its position and function in the world of 
production. 2. The apparatus of state coer-
cive power which ‘legally’ enforces disci-
pline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ 
either actively or passively. This apparatus 
is, however, constituted for the whole of so-
ciety in anticipation of moments of crisis of 
command and direction when spontaneous 
consent has failed. (12)
The organic intellectuals also have an important 
role to play during the establishment of the histor-
ical bloc. For Gramsci, the conception of historical 
bloc is a point of departure from Marx6. Putting it 
simply; whereas Marx had argued that the super-
structure was determined entirely by the economic 
base structure, i.e. the forces and relations of pro-
duction, the economic and material conditions of 
people would determine the cultural, political in-
stitutions of everyday life etc., Gramsci disagreed 
with him on this issue. He argues that, with the 
establishment of the historical bloc, structure and 
superstructure are unified and the hegemony of the 
ruling class is constantly being reinforced and the 
relationship between the two structures does not 
remain unilateral. One of the most important Gram-
5 The reader should keep in mind that Gramsci wrote these 
notebooks in the prisons of Italy under the Fascist regime of 
Benito Mussolini, thus, he uses the word “group”, instead of 
“class”, the traditional Marxist jargon, for fear of censorship. 
Notes are mine.
6 While methodologically a Marxist, Gramsci has disagreed 
with Marx on several different points, going so far as declaring 
the October Revolution of 1917 as “the revolution against 
Kapital!”
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 Ahmet İnsel, a professor of economy and a 
former dean of the Faculty of Economics of Univer-
sité Paris I – Panthéon Sorbonne and Galatasaray 
University, was one of the organic intellectuals that 
supported the rise of AKP. He attempted to analyse 
the progress of the movement using a liberal dichot-
omy of centre/periphery, despite having written ex-
tensively on socialism and claiming to be a social-
ist. In his 2003 article, published both in The South 
Atlantic Quarterly and the website of Birikim, İnsel 
argues that after the coup d’état of 1980 and the es-
tablishment of the new constitution which carries 
heavy military and statist influences, the society 
was confined to the periphery, since the new regime 
strictly patrolled any kind of political activity and 
did not allow anything outside the Kemalist republi-
can structure to be represented. Following the rap-
id economic liberalization period of the 1980s, the 
peripheral society used the economic opportunities 
to re-emerge as a significant group. The AKP is the 
latest, and so far, the most powerful representative 
of the new middle class. İnsel defends the so-called 
democratic stance of the AKP in every aspect, ex-
cept for their attitude on women, and writes that:
“The program’s […] statement that democ-
racy is distinguished from all other regimes 
by the fundamental principle of the sover-
eignty of the people, and its definition of de-
mocracy as a system based on tolerance are 
all signs that AKP could be a consistent de-
fender of a pluralist parliamentary regime.” 
(304)
İnsel concludes his article by expressing his high 
hopes and expectations from the AKP:
The unexpected new composition of the 
parliament, the fact that the party posi-
tioned at the most distant point from the 
state has formed a majority government, 
and the aspirations and expectations of the 
new middle classes supporting this party 
provide reasons to think that an opportuni-
tegrating with global capitalism. The electoral cam-
paign of AKP prior to being elected saw a fundamen-
tal departure from the Islamist discourse, adapting 
it to conform with the rising neoliberal trend in the 
world, emphasizing specifically their ambition to 
become a member state of the European Union. The 
AKP combined this liberal discourse with Muslim el-
ements and demonized the authoritarian Kemalist8 
modernization 
project of the 
early 20th cen-
tury. In addition 
to the Kemalist 
modernization 
project, the on-
going attitude of 
the Turkish Armed Forces in the name of protecting 
the Turkish democracy9 were portrayed as the main 
factors which impeded the democratization process 
of Turkey. With the carefully planned use of these 
elements, AKP received significant national and in-
ternational support. Following an “e-memorandum” 
posted by the Commander of the Turkish Armed 
Forces on April 27, 2007, the AKP decided to do ev-
erything they can to mobilize their supporters and 
call for a snap election. Receiving praise from the 
intellectuals for their “honourable” stand against a 
possible military intervention, the AKP was able to 
form a second consecutive majority government by 
obtaining 46.58% of the votes and 341 deputies out of 
the 550 in the Assembly10.
8 Kemalism is defined as the founding ideology of the Republic 
of Turkey. Established by the founding leader of the country, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the roots of Kemalism principally lie 
with French Enlightenment values: secularism, nationalism 
and economic liberalism, together with a break from the Otto-
man past and rapid Westernization of the country.
9 The military was considered to be a “shadow actor” in Turkish 
politics, having intervened directly or indirectly on 1960, 1971, 
1980 and 1997. The coup d’état of 1980 was the most brutal one, 
whereas it was the intervention of 1997 which has been gener-
ally used in AKP’s discourse, since it was directed against one 
of the former parties in the Islamist party tradition. The failed 
intervention of July 2016 has been omitted for two reasons: a) 
its apparent failure and questions about its authenticity, and 
b) it occurred almost a decade after the epoch with which this 
paper is concerned.
10 The official results are published in the website of the Su-
preme Electoral Board (in Turkish): http://www.ysk.gov.tr/
tr/1983-2007-yillari-arasi-milletvekili-genel-secimleri/3008.
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It remains a mystery if Belge, who had a falling-out 
with AKP and Erdoğan in 2013, and has been criticiz-
ing them ever since, has realized or not, that thanks 
to his articles, statements and newspaper columns, 
he had been an integral part of the party’s Grams-
cian strategy.
 The third and final author that I will mention 
is Ömer Laçiner, a former socialist revolutionary 
who has been part of the brain team of Birikim since 
its foundation. Laçiner, who hailed AKP’s victory in 
2002 as a “more extensive and profound revolution 
than that on 1946-195011” (2002), was also among 
those who acknowledged that AKP had a significant 
amount of support from the new, organic intelligen-
tsia while establishing its intellectual hegemony. In 
an article written following the 2007 elections, he 
claims that:
Should the AKP, in this second term in pow-
er, be able to transcend the plain socioeco-
nomic interests of the class(es) that they 
represent, meaning if they would be able to 
act like a “mission party” which has been 
able to prioritize the will to transform Tur-
key into a country that has the fundamental 
values and standards of a civilized society; 
the moral and intellectual support of the 
aforementioned left-liberal intellectual so-
ciety will surely continue. (Laçiner 2007)
Although Laçiner is not an established member of 
the academia as the previous writers examined 
in the paper, it is worth noting that as one of the 
editors-in-chief of Birikim, he was widely respected 
in the socialist community before being absorbed 
into the organic intelligentsia. Needless to say, he 
no longer is held in such high esteem within the 
community.
11 On 1946, the Republic of Turkey had its first multi-party elec-
tion. Since it was riddled with controversies, such as closed 
counting of the votes, several historians and political scien-
tists argue that the elections of 1950, where the newly founded 
Democratic Party won against the Republican People’s Party, 
were the first free elections in the country, according to liberal 
norms.
ty for a mild but radical exit from the Sep-
tember 12 regime has arisen. The realization 
of such an exit, not by the traditional West-
ernizers, but by a movement like AKP, which 
Westernizing-statist elites regard with sus-
picion, will finally make the normalization 
of Turkey’s century-old Westernization ad-
venture possible. (306)
Another one of the powerful intellectuals who 
had supported AKP until 2013 is Murat Belge, a 
comparative literature professor at Istanbul Bilgi 
University. Known for his contribution to Turkish 
Marxist literature with important translations such 
as the Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844 by Karl Marx, Belge had welcomed the AKP as 
the “secret and unwanted left-wing” party of Turkey. 
In an interview with Ruşen Çakır, an important 
journalist who focuses on Islamic movements in 
Turkey, Belge states that: “The leftism of AKP isn’t 
an apparent, ideological phenomenon, it originates 
from their class origins.” (Belge 2003) For someone 
who claims to be a Marxist, Murat Belge hesitated 
to criticize the AKP as much as he criticized the 
left-wing movements in the country. In his 2009 
paper, he praises the AKP for pursuing the aim of 
European Union membership, insisting that this is 
a code name for the democratization of Turkey and 
emphasizes once again that he sees the military as 
the main obstacle.
In reality, all factors that create instability 
and undermine the ordinary functioning of 
society contribute to the dominance of the 
military and legitimize its interventions. 
In this respect the socialists have much to 
learn from the AKP, which, knowingly or not, 
has employed a version of Gramscian strat-
egy in gaining ground and avoiding con-
frontation, although this policy may now 
have come to an end with the assault on the 
party emanating from the judicial branch of 
the Kemalist state.” (Belge 19)
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Hegemonya Yeniden Kurulurken Sol Liberalizm ve 
Taraf (Left Liberalism and Taraf During the Re-Es-
tablishment of Hegemony) by Aras Aladağ and The 
Turkish AK Party and its Leader: Criticism, Opposi-
tion and Dissent, edited by Ümit Cizre. The readers 
are encouraged to read these books and several oth-
er academic works that can be found on the Inter-
net, should the topic interest them.
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CONCLUSION
Throughout the course of this paper, I attempted to 
briefly summarize how the new intelligentsia and 
the organic intellectual community have support-
ed the AKP and Erdoğan while they were trying to 
enforce their hegemony over Turkish society, which, 
as the results of the latest presidential referendum 
and election have indicated12, has ended with the 
complete establishment of the historical bloc. The 
support of these authors, that used to be widely re-
spected in their communities, was unfortunately 
not limited to AKP’s first two terms of government, 
they have also backed AKP before the referendum 
on 2010 which was about the reorganization of the 
judicial branch of the state. 
 Criminalizing any opposition to the pro-
posed constitutional changes, the Birikim troika 
and their allies have used the similar Kemalist = 
authoritarian vs. AKP = liberal dichotomy to accuse 
anyone who disagreed with them as the obstacles 
against the democratization process of the country. 
Between AKP’s second victory in 2007 and the end 
of the alliance on 2013, the Birikim crew had allied 
themselves with the writers of the journal, Taraf 
(Camp). Taraf was viewed by those who opposed AKP 
as an operation newspaper13, since it published sev-
eral news reports and articles that led to lawsuits 
against AKP’s fierce opponents, mostly the military. 
Further research on the role of both Taraf and Biri-
kim in the hegemonic rise of AKP exists, notably 
12 On April 2017, the Turkish population voted to change their 
political system from parliamentary democracy to a strong 
presidential system. The yes vote, heavily supported by Er-
doğan and AKP, officially received 51.4% of the votes in the 
most controversial vote in the history of the country. One year 
later, on June 2018, the country went to the ballots again to 
elect its first president in the new system. Held once again in 
severely unreliable conditions that received worldwide crit-
icism, Erdoğan won the election in the first round, officially 
receiving 52.6% of the votes.
13 The term operation newspaper was used to define the role 
of Taraf in manufacturing consent for the upcoming lawsuits 
against the army, the bureaucrats who were close to the mil-
itary and the nationalist intellectuals. The opponents of AKP 
have claimed that by the use of this newspaper and the law-
suits that came with it, the role of the military as the watch-
man of democracy in Turkey was undermined, which led to the 
AKP being able to establish full control over the state appara-
tus. The newspaper was shut down by a decree on 2016, passed 
by the government of the same party
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com/birikim-yazi/2552/dp-anap-ve-sonun-
da-akp. Accessed on 14 Sep 2018.
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